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Abstract
Civil Aviation Authorities are elaborating a new regulatory framework for the
safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Current proposals are
based on the analysis of the specific risks of the operation as well as on the
definition of some risk mitigation measures. In order to achieve the target level
of safety, we propose increasing the level of automation by providing the on-
board system with Automated Contingency Management functions. The aim
of the resulting Safe Mission Manager System is to autonomously adapt to con-
tingency events while still achieving mission objectives through the degradation
of mission performance. In this paper, we discuss some of the architectural
issues in designing this system. The resulting architecture makes a conceptual
differentiation between event monitoring, decision-making on a policy for deal-
ing with contingencies and the execution of the corresponding policy. We also
discuss how to allocate the different Safe Mission Manager components to a par-
titioned, Integrated Modular Avionics architecture. Finally, determinism and
predictability are key aspects in contingency management due to their overall
impact on safety. For this reason, we model and verify the correctness of a
contingency management policy using formal methods.
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1. Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been developing very quickly, thus
presenting a challenge to traditional aviation. The European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) is elaborating a new regulatory framework for the operation
of UAS. The current proposal establishes three categories of UAS operation5
according to their risk levels [1, 2]. The open category is for low risk opera-
tions where safety is ensured through compliance with operational limitations,
mass limitations, product safety requirements and a minimum set of opera-
tional rules. Authorization from a National Aviation Authority (NAA) is not
required. The specific category is for medium risk operations and requires NAA10
authorization based on a risk assessment performed by the operator. A manual
of operations lists the risk mitigation measures. Finally, the certified category
is for large UAS flying in non-segregated airspace, the requirements for which
are comparable to those for manned aviation. The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) addresses this category in Doc. 10019 AN/507 [3]. Ac-15
cording to that document, “only unmanned aircraft that are remotely piloted
could be integrated alongside manned aircraft in non-segregated airspace and
at aerodromes”. This work is focused on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPAS), a subclass of UAS.
The specific risks of an RPAS operation as compared to manned aviation20
are: 1) reduced situational awareness of the remote pilot, and 2) risk of los-
ing the communication & control (C2) link between the remote pilot and the
unmanned aircraft. In the former case, reduced situational awareness means
that remote pilots, unlike pilots of manned aircraft in visual conditions, have
reduced perception of environmental elements and events, which results in com-25
plex decision-making, especially during an emergency. In the latter case, the C2
link loss is a degradation or failure of the communication channel, which may
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result in the aircraft “flying not under command” [3].
UAS that aim to operate within the specific category, and ultimately within
the certified category, are required to mitigate the aforementioned specific risks30
in order to achieve the target level of safety. This can be accomplished through
several complementary approaches, such as setting the aforementioned opera-
tional limitations and even imposing certain functional requirements onto the
on-board equipment. For example, some special technical equipment is often re-
quired to compensate for the reduced situational awareness, mainly Detect and35
Avoid (DAA) devices [3]. Another approach relies on operational flight plan-
ning and development of operations manuals with provisions for contingency
handling.
In general, the functional requirements imposed on the on-board equipment
exemplify the need for increased autonomous flight capabilities in RPAS. This40
is a focus of this paper. The software framework under development by the
German Aerospace Center (DLR) for its research fleet of unmanned aircraft
enables high level autonomous behaviors. One of its key software components
is the automated Mission Planner and Execution (MiPlEx) system. MiPlEx
performs real-time mission plan execution, 3-D world modeling, as well as al-45
gorithms for combinatorial motion planning and task scheduling [4, 5]. The
Technical University of Valencia (UPV) is also developing a similar component
based on the same architectural principles [6]. However, both Mission Manager
implementations have so far only made use of operational limitations to achieve
the target level of safety, e.g. operating in Very Low Level (VLL) or segregated50
airspace. As a collaboration between the two institutions, the goal is to safely
increase the level of automation to develop a Safe Mission Manager System.
This concept expands on the current Mission Manager by incorporating Au-
tomated Contingency Management (ACM) functions. The resulting system is
expected to adapt autonomously to contingencies, while still achieving mission55
objectives by allowing some degradation on mission performance.
In this paper, we discuss the architectural design of the proposed Safe Mis-
sion Manager System. In addition, we also discuss how to allocate the different
3
software components of the resulting system to an Integrated Modular Avionics
(IMA) architecture. Finally, we propose using formal methods for specifying and60
verifying the contingency management policy. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: Sec. 2 presents related works in bibliography; Sec. 3 describes the
initial Mission Manager System; Sec. 4 identifies the need for contingency man-
agement in RPAS; Sec. 5 discusses architectural considerations for integrating
ACM functions into the previous Mission Manager; Sec. 6 presents the safety65
aspects relating to the software development of the resulting system; Sec. 7 de-
velops the contingency management policy using formal methods; and finally,
Sec. 8 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
The main topics of this paper are contingency management architectures,70
with special emphasis on UAS specific contingencies, and the use of formal
methods in the software development process.
The primary guidelines for contingency management can be found in the pro-
posals of regulatory frameworks for operating UAS currently being drawn up
by Civil Aviation Authorities. These guidelines define risks and propose some75
risk mitigation procedures, among other things. UAS regulation in Europe is
led by EASA, which has published the Introduction of a regulatory framework
for the operation of unmanned aircraft [1], and the Roadmap for the Integra-
tion of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Navigation System
[7]. A similar effort has been undertaken by the Unmanned Aircraft Systems80
Registration Task Force of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the
United States [8, 9]. In addition, the ICAO has published the Manual on RPAS
[3] to provide guidance on technical and operational issues applicable to the
integration of RPAS in non-segregated airspace and at aerodromes.
There is an important research effort behind the regulatory proposals. The85
main research frameworks are the SESAR program in Europe [10] and the
NextGen program in the United States. Some of the projects falling within
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these initiatives are also related to this work. One of the most relevant is the
Automated Contingency Management (ACM) [11, 12, 13], which is a NASA-led
research project in collaboration with Impact Technologies, LLC and Georgia90
Tech. ACM is designed to improve the reliability and survivability of safety-
critical aerospace systems. The approach of ACM differs from the one presented
in this paper in its focus on control optimization techniques rather than on the
use of formal methods. One interesting extension to this approach is the work
in [14] where human-machine interface considerations in contingency manage-95
ment are discussed. Another NASA project on drones is the Unmanned Air-
craft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM). The UTM concept [15] was
proposed as a traffic management scheme to enable civilian low-altitude UAS
operations. This work’s most relevant proposal with regard to contingency
management is the level of automation. The proposed scheme ranges from a100
completely manual process relying on the operator (Build 1) to fully automatic,
large-scale, system-wide contingency handling (Build 4).
The DLR has also conducted important research in the field of RPAS in the
WASLA-HALE project for the High Altitude Long Endurance domain. Some
research work focuses on the procedures and techniques for integrating UAS105
into controlled airspace [16, 17]. The proposed procedures are mainly related to
C2 link failure conditions and communication with ATC. Another interesting
aspect is the use of formal descriptions for enabling automatic reasoning on the
consistency and correctness of the model requirements and the generation of
on-line monitoring checks [18]. Case studies show that the process of formally110
writing down requirements is extremely helpful in understanding the domain
inherent concepts [19].
The introduction of a Safety Monitor like the one in this paper is also sug-
gested in [20]. The goal of the referenced work, however, is to expand the
operational range and raise the autonomy level, rather than contingency han-115
dling. The work in [21] presents a predictive alerting method that uses multiple
hypothesis prediction. It integrates all the onboard sensors and information
sources with a stochastic estimator to obtain an accurate and reliable estima-
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tion of the aircraft state, which is key for contingency detection.
Regarding contingency management policies, C2 link loss is one of the most120
difficult to handle since any other contingency may also occur after it. The work
in [22] presents a method for computing optimal lost-link policies for unmanned
aircraft conducting surveillance alongside manned aircraft in a wildfire scenario.
Another contingency handling policy especially important to UAS is collision
avoidance. The work in the NextGen and SESAR programs led to the definition125
of a new Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) based on new logics,
namely ACAS X. Its definition contains two particular variations: ACAS Xa for
large aircraft, and ACAS Xu for unmanned aircraft. The work in [23] describes
the specificities and challenges to the ACAS Xu system.
3. Initial Mission Manager architecture130
The Mission Manager is the core system for performing the automatic guid-
ance and control of the RPAS. Its functionality is based on the definition of
a Mission Plan that basically specifies the RPAS route and payload actions.
Both the MiPlEx framework and the Mission Manager developed at the UPV
implement a software architecture based on the ideas of the three-tier (3T) ar-135
chitecture [24]. In general, a 3T architecture separates the intelligent control
problem into three interacting layers named Deliberative layer, Sequencing layer,
and Reactive layer. In this approach, the 3T concept has been applied from a
flight guidance and control perspective, and the three layers have been renamed
as Path Planner, Guidance System, and Flight Director, respectively, shown in140
Fig. 1:
The Path Planner is the high level component that has the ability to generate
a reference trajectory for the Guidance System. As it is shown in Fig. 1, there
exist multiple path planners that provide different path planning policies. The
“Mission Planner” is a path planner that generates this trajectory based on the145
directives of the Mission Plan. In this approach, the Mission Plan is specified as



































Figure 1: The initial Mission Manager architecture is structured into three layers: the Path
Planners, the Guidance System, and the Flight Director.
Thus, the role of the Mission Planner is to provide each flight leg to the Guidance
System in a sequential manner. In parallel to the Mission Planner, there exist
some other Task Specific Planners for special tasks, such as the exploration of150
unknown terrain. From an abstract point of view, both the Mission Planner
and the Task Specific Planners belong to a same class of objects with the ability
to provide instructions for the Guidance System based on different criteria.
The remote pilot should select the required Task Specific Planner manually in
accordance with the current operational condition.155
The Guidance System determines how to fly the reference trajectory pro-
vided by the active Path Planner and then activates the appropriate control
modes of the Flight Director. To do so, the Guidance System uses a library
of elemental maneuvers in the lateral plane (LNAV) and in the vertical plane
(VNAV). LNAV maneuvers include straight maneuvers (with constant heading,160
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with constant course, etc.) and turn maneuvers (with constant radius, with
constant turn rate, etc). VNAV maneuvers include flight level maneuvers and
climb/descent maneuvers (at constant speed, at constant vertical speed, etc).
Thus, each time a new reference trajectory is received, the Guidance System
plans a suitable sequence of maneuvers. The sequence of maneuvers in the165
LNAV plane is independent of the sequence of maneuvers in the VNAV plane.
Once the list of elemental maneuvers has been planned, the Guidance System
activates the LNAV maneuvers and the VNAV maneuvers for carrying out the
plan in a sequential manner. Only one LNAV maneuver and one VNAV maneu-
ver can be active at a time. According to these active maneuvers, an interpreter170
activates the appropriate control modes of the Flight Director. The interpreter
also computes the target values (the reference state) for the selected modes
using different guidance algorithms. For example, the control mode for flying
a turn with a constant radius is the heading control mode; and the algorithm
that computes the target heading for this mode is based on the “carrot-chasing”175
algorithm in [26].
Each control mode is flown until some target event occurs. For example,
the turn with a constant radius can be flown until the RPAS reaches a given
waypoint, or until a given time-out occurs, for instance. When this target event
is triggered, the Guidance System selects the next maneuver in the sequence.180
When the sequence of maneuvers is completed, the Guidance System notifies
the Path Planner so that the high-level component will provide a new reference
trajectory.
Finally, the Flight Director implements the control loops of the autopilot
control modes. For example, the autopilot has the “heading control” mode, the185
“altitude control” mode, the “vertical speed control” mode, etc. The Flight
Director can be commanded not only by the upper layers of the architecture,
but also by the remote pilot directly.
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3.1. Levels of automation
As can be seen in discussion above, the initial Mission Manager provides190
two levels of automation, named manual operation and automatic operation.
Manual operation covers any mode in which the guidance actions are performed
by the remote pilot. This includes direct control on the aircraft using the yoke,
as well as giving the proper targets to the Flight Director. Manual operation
is often used to execute flight procedures that are hard or unsafe to automate,195
such as take-off or landing procedures. By contrast, in the automatic operation,
the guidance actions are performed by the upper layers of the architecture.
The level of automation plays a key role in aviation since allocating respon-
sibilities between a human operator and an automatic system can lead to unsafe
situations [27, 28]. Sheridan introduced a taxonomy with 10 automation lev-200
els [29] that characterize this interaction. According to this, manual operation
is level 1, while automatic operation ranges from level 5 to 6. This means that
the remote pilot is always in charge of decision making: he or she must always
approve or reject the reference trajectory computed by the automatic system to
ensure predictable behavior. As a result, automatic operation still puts some205
performance requirements on the C2 link, but not as stringently as it does in
manual mode.
In this paper, we will describe the transformation of the previous Mission
Manager into a Safe Mission Manager that handles contingencies; and we will
discuss how to allocate the different software components of the resulting system210
to a partitioned environment based on the IMA concept.
4. Contingencies in RPAS
The aforementioned Mission Manager is able to perform the intended RPAS
mission as long as it is executed in a nominal condition. However, at some
point in the mission execution, a contingency may occur. Contingencies are215
unforeseen events that put other airspace users or people and facilities on the
ground at risk [1, 2]. Several important contingencies have been identified in
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RPAS [30]. Some of them are common to manned aviation –e.g. a traffic alert or
the loss of control–, while others are specific to RPAS. Introducing contingency
management functions into an RPAS means providing the on-board system with220
the ability to handle contingencies for the purpose of mitigating safety risks.
The source of contingencies are faults. These include both system com-
ponent faults and human faults. Component faults occur when some aircraft
component –such as an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), an engine, a Global
Positioning System (GPS), or a barometric system– fails. Human faults refer to225
piloting errors, Air Traffic Control (ATC) errors, and any other faults related
to inappropriate aircraft operation. There is a causal relation between faults
and contingencies. For example, a GPS fault could cause inaccuracy in posi-
tion determination, thus resulting in a mission boundary violation contingency.
Another example is the loss of control due to a faulty IMU. Faults usually degen-230
erate into contingencies after some short period of time. Early fault detection
is key for effective contingency management.
Increasing the level of safety in an aircraft is usually accomplished using two
complementary techniques: fault tolerance and risk mitigation. Fault tolerance
is the ability to continue operating in the event of a failure. Risk mitigation is235
the process of incorporating defenses or preventive controls to lower the severity
and/or likelihood of the projected consequence of a hazard. This is a two step
process: when some fault is not tolerated and becomes a failure, then risk miti-
gation measures are needed. Faults affecting critical system components can be
tolerated using redundancy. Full redundancy means replicating a component240
with exactly the same functionality and performance. Graceful degradation is
the ability to maintain a limited or degraded functionality when some compo-
nent fails. For example, GPS navigation could be replaced with dead-reckoning
when the GPS fails, though at the cost of position accuracy. An important
difference between system faults and human faults is that system faults can245
be tolerated to some extent by the use of redundancy, while human errors and
inappropriate aircraft operation can only be handled through risk mitigation.










Figure 2: Framework of techniques for keeping safety in RPAS. Source: [31].
in RPAS is setting some boundary limits on RPAS operation. The goal here is
to avoid the RPAS accidentally going out of its operations area or flying over250
dangerous or prohibited areas.
In the specific case of RPAS, there is a third barrier to enforcing safety
in addition to fault tolerance and risk mitigation techniques: flight termina-
tion. Flight termination procedures make it possible to immediately ground the
RPAS, for example by deploying a parachute, or using a self-destructive device.255
This option is crucial because it helps lower the severity of some risks and fault
conditions in the safety assessment: the consequences associated with an unfore-
seen event can be minimized if it is possible to terminate the flight expeditiously.
In any case, the flight termination procedure should be considered to be a last
resort when no other option can mitigate the effect of the contingency, or when260
other actions have resulted ineffective for the situation being faced. A summary
of the different techniques that can be applied for keeping an adequate level of
safety can be found in Fig. 2, and is in agreement with the work in [31].
It is important to consider the most specific contingency in RPAS, which is
the C2 link loss. Proper handling of this event is strictly required by ICAO for265
operating in non-segregated airspace [3]. Moreover, assuming that any combi-
nation of contingencies can happen in conjunction with C2 link loss, some sort
of ACM ability is necessarily required to handle the situation. ACM functions
make use of risk mitigation and flight termination techniques to generate recov-
ery maneuvers or trajectories that effectively cope with a contingency situation270
without pilot intervention. Consequently, the level of automation of a Mission
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Manager System performing ACM functions should be increased to provide au-
tonomous operation. In this extended mode, the automatic system assumes
flight guidance as well as decision-making responsibilities. This corresponds to
a Sheridan level higher than 6, which goes beyond conventional FMSs [32, 33].275
The next section discusses how to integrate ACM functions into the initial Mis-
sion Manager System.
5. Architectural considerations towards Automated Contingency Man-
agement in RPAS
The proposed Automated Contingency Management functions will be de-280
signed under the hypothesis that the RPAS has a Flight Termination System
(FTS) that is able to terminate the flight expeditiously, and that this measure
is an effective mechanism for enforcing safety. The need for this mechanism
is supported by a number of aviation stakeholders [3, 32, 33, 34]. They also
indicate that this action is to be triggered manually by the remote pilot as well285
as autonomously by the on-board system. This latter aspect implies that it is
necessary to specify in the embedded software a list of predefined conditions for
the automatic activation of the FTS.
Based on the initial hypothesis, the ability to engage the FTS becomes a
safety-critical function. Critical software in aerospace is subject to strict vali-290
dation and verification (V&V) processes defined by the DO-178 standard [35].
According to this document, a software component that cannot be completely
verified at the design phase should not adversely affect safety. As a consequence,
the list of predefined conditions that determines the automatic activation of the
FTS must be hardcoded in the embedded software so that extensive testing can295
be performed at the design stage.
Commanding the flight termination action is a drastic decision, though. Ac-
cording to the safety framework in Fig. 2, less extreme risk mitigation measures
could also be attempted for mitigating the risk inherent to contingencies in








Figure 3: Safety thresholds managed by the Safety Monitor.
is not strictly necessary (because there is still a flight termination mechanism,
and it can be thoroughly tested), and that having flexibility to specify some
aspects of the contingency management policy would be beneficial to the final
user. For this reason, we advocate separating ACM functions into two separate
components, named the Safety Monitor and Contingency Manager, each with a305
different impact on the safety process.
Firstly, the role of the Safety Monitor is to check system behavior for unsafe
states; and when an unsafe state is detected, to take the critical decision of
whether a risk mitigation action is feasible, or whether the flight termination
action is required instead. This decision depends on the criticality of the re-310
sulting state. Accordingly, the Safety Monitor manages two safety thresholds,
represented in Fig. 3. When a first threshold is exceeded, the criticality is such
that there is still a safety margin for attempting a risk mitigation action. The
resolution of this state will be delegated to the Contingency Manager. But if the
mitigation action fails and a second threshold is surpassed, the Safety Monitor315
will command the FTS to ensure that safety is not further compromised.
Secondly, when a risk mitigation measure is feasible, the Contingency Man-
ager should react and plan the appropriate action for reducing the probability
of infringing the second safety threshold, and ultimately attempting to recover
the nominal condition of the RPAS. Mitigation actions, also called contingency320
procedures, replace the current reference trajectory of the RPAS with a new
one that is more suitable for the contingency state being faced. For this rea-
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son, once a selection has been made, the Contingency Manager will notify the
Mission Manager to execute the selected action.
However, defining a risk mitigation policy for dealing with contingencies325
is a complex matter. In some cases, there could exist multiple contingency
procedures that could be effective, and the solution might depend on multiple
factors. The extent to which this policy can be customized by the final user is
another design issue that will be discussed later in this section. In any case,
the fact that some aspects of this policy are open to modification by the final330
user implies that the Contingency Manager cannot be completely verified at the
design stage, so it cannot be fully trusted.
As a result, the proposed differentiation between Safety Monitor and Contin-
gency Manager provides an interesting tradeoff between safety and robustness:
the Safety Monitor can enforce safety at any time during the mission, even335
when everything else fails; and the Contingency Manager enhances robustness
of the system by providing solutions to contingency states. The implementation
of the Safety Monitor must be hardcoded at the design phase so that exten-
sive testing can be performed; in contrast, the verification of the Contingency
Manager is subject to user modification. Safety aspects relating to the software340
development of this architecture will be further discussed in Sec. 6.
In summary, the execution of the proposed contingency management scheme
will be composed of the following steps: 1) monitoring the system behavior to
detect and diagnose contingencies, 2) deciding on a policy for dealing with
contingencies, and 3) executing the corresponding policy. In this scheme, the345
first step will be performed by the Safety Monitor; the second step will be
performed at two levels by the Safety Monitor and by the Contingency Manager;
and the third one will be performed by the Mission Manager or the Flight
Termination System, depending on the selected policy.
Thus, the initial Mission Manager architecture will be extended with three350
new software components to perform ACM functions. The resulting Safe Mis-
sion Manager architecture is presented in Fig. 4. Note that the “Mission Man-
























Figure 4: Safe Mission Manager architecture with four major components: Safety Monitor,
Contingency Manager, Mission Manager and Flight Termination Systems.
picted in Fig. 1. In addition to the new software components, the Mission
Manager module will also be internally redesigned to enable it to execute the355
contingency handlers. A contingency handler produces the reference trajectory
of the mitigation actions that are enabled by the Contingency Manager. The
sub-sections below will discuss the different components in more detail.
5.1. Detecting contingency states
Detecting unsafe states and triggering alarms is considered safety critical360
functionality. An interesting approach for this task is the use of formal specifi-
cations to derive safety monitors. The advantage of this methodology is that it
enables very efficient monitors that can be verified because they are automati-
cally derived from a formal specification. This technique has been an important
research topic for checking software and hardware behavior in embedded sys-365
tems [36]. We propose using similar techniques for system health management
and the detection of unsafe conditions [37]. We discuss below how to integrate
monitoring into the system architecture.
An aircraft is a distributed system consisting of a large number of inde-
pendent subsystems. Critical system components are usually required to self-370
monitor, to perform fault detection and to report their faults. This is the case for
the GPS subsystem, where Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
systems are prescribed. Another example is the Airborne Collision Avoidance
subsystem (ACAS), which is able to detect collision threats autonomously.
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However, safety monitoring should be performed not only inside each sub-375
system but at the system level as well. This requires having access to the global
system state because an unsafe situation can be formally specified as a predicate
on the system state. We understand as a“global” state the aggregation of the
states of a set of subcomponents of a distributed system [38]. As an example,
consider the following unsafe condition: “the distance to the airport is greater380
than the mileage allowed by the reserve fuel remaining”. Checking this predi-
cate involves knowledge as to the airport location, the aircraft position and the
remaining fuel. Even if the subsystems that estimate these state variables are
failure free and are not reporting any alarm, if these data are processed at a
system level, then an unsafe situation can hold. In general, all contingencies385
derived from inappropriate aircraft operation involve the state of several system
components.
Thus, online safety monitoring requires some centralized, high level compo-
nent that coordinates all the distributed monitors and performs diagnoses at
the system level. Performing this task implies that some knowledge about the390
normal behavior of the system is presented to the real-time reasoning. This
knowledge can be typically developed using model-based or data-based tech-
niques [39]: in model-based techniques, it is derived from theoretical models,
while in data-based techniques, it is inferred from empirical experiments of
fault-free operation.395
One of the main problems is the reliability of the detection mechanisms.
This refers to the probability of reporting false alarms or skipping true alarms.
The main problem in creating a robust system is that sensors are imperfect and
noisy. This results in uncertainty in the state determination. For this reason,
the use of deterministic logic to define alarm conditions on the state variables400
does not guarantee reliable detection. Some proposed techniques for dealing
with uncertainty are fuzzy logic [40], stochastic alarm detection techniques [41]
and Markov decision processes [42]. Consequently, the Safety Monitor should
also manage alarm thresholds.
























Figure 5: Generic model of a centralized Safety Monitor for RPAS.
tic state automaton [43]. However, current work is still at a conceptual level, so
we will assume ideal detection mechanisms and avoid the uncertainty analysis.
The resulting simplified model is depicted in Fig. 5. The state automaton in
this figure starts at a nominal state where no contingency events have occurred.
Within this state, the RPAS is flying the planned mission in a manual or auto-410
matic manner. According to the safety thresholds in Fig. 3, the Safety Monitor
can trigger two types of contingency events: when the first safety boundary is
exceeded, it triggers a “soft” contingency event. Such events make the system
shift into a contingency state where a given mitigation action can be planned. In
this state, the Contingency Manager will be enabled. When the second bound-415
ary is exceeded, the Safety Monitor will raise a “hard” contingency event, which
results in a state where the only feasible action is flight termination; this will
be handled by the Flight Termination System.
Once in a risk mitigation state, if the mitigation action turns out to be effec-
tive, a recovery event will bring the system back to the nominal state; otherwise,420
the system will remain in the same state and further mitigation actions can be
planned. In addition, subsequent contingencies may also occur. However, we
believe effective handling of nested alerts is highly unfeasible in most cases. For
this reason, the approach for dealing with these conditions will be prevention:
avoiding, whenever possible, the occurrence of new contingency events by using425
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a safe and conservative design of the mitigation actions; otherwise, new events
often lead to the flight termination state.
5.2. Defining a policy for dealing with contingencies
Once a risk mitigation state is entered, the next step is to decide on a pol-
icy for dealing with the resulting flight condition. The role of the Contingency430
Manager is to select a mitigation action that tries to partially complete the mis-
sion, probably in some degraded form, while maintaining safety. This requires
addressing a decision-making problem that should balance the rewards with the
risks associated with each possible action to maximize the probability of suc-
cess, see Fig. 6. Once a decision has been made, the Contingency Manager will435
instruct the Mission Manager to execute this action.
In general, the decision-making process for selecting a mitigation action de-
pends on not only the contingency event reported by the Safety Monitor, but also
on other state variables. For example, the Contingency Manager could make
different decisions about how to handle a traffic alert depending on whether440
the RPAS is flying in controlled or uncontrolled airspace. The decision is even
more complex when several concurrent events are reported by the Safety Mon-
itor. For this reason, the Contingency Manager also needs to have access to
the global system state, as shown in Fig 4. Although the system state is huge
















Figure 6: Decision logic for finding a feasible action after a contingency happens.
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to the following subset: the aircraft position (including the segment of flight
in which the contingency happens, and the airspace class) and the contingency
event being faced.
As a result, the decision logic for selecting a suitable mitigation action can
be also modeled as a state automaton. We call the specification of this au-450
tomaton the Contingency Plan. It determines the behavior of the RPAS after a
contingency occurs. The aim of this plan should be to reduce the time of flight
of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) experiencing the contingency [3]. The
design of the Contingency Plan is a sensitive task because the resulting logic
must: a) be deterministic, and ensure predictable behavior even without pilot455
intervention [3, 44]; and b) comply with current regulations (e.g. rules of the
air [45] or procedures for emergency situations [46, 47]).
An interesting design issue is which level of customization is allowed in the
design of the Contingency Plan; or, in other words, to what extent should the
Contingency Plan be hardcoded into the embedded software. Two opposing460
trends affect this issue. One the one hand, having the flexibility to specify this
plan on a mission basis –thus avoiding the hardcoding of policies– can make the
remote pilot handle a contingency scenario in a more responsive way. On the
other hand, since the specification of a state automaton with lots of states and
transitions is a difficult and critical task, it must be verified; and the specification465
and verification of a safe state automation is considered to be beyond the scope
of an RPAS operator.
For this reason, we have opted for the following mixed solution: the spec-
ification of the Contingency Plan is assigned to the system developer and is
hardcoded into the embedded software; but if the mitigation actions have some470
configuration parameters defining how to execute this action, then they can be
specified in a Mission Plan pre-flight. This solution implies that the validation
of the Contingency Manager is subject to the validation of the Mission Plan at
operation time: the Contingency Manager will be safe only if the Mission Plan
specification is correct.475
As an example, assume that “land at a designated landing site” is one pos-
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sible mitigation action, and that the configuration parameters of this action are
the list of suitable landing sites, as well as the routes towards these sites. Then,
according to this proposal, the remote pilot will not be able to specify what
state leads to the selection of this action, but he or she will be able to specify480
the possible landing sites, and the possible routes for reaching them. In addi-
tion, the decision on performing this procedure will be safe only if the Mission
Plan has been approved by the corresponding aviation authority. Finally, the
design of a Mission Plan specification that deals with contingency handling is a
research problem that is currently under study.485
5.3. Executing the selected mitigation action
To execute the selected policy, the corresponding contingency handlers must
be provided to the on-board system. Contingency handlers implement the mit-
igation actions that will be executed in response to a contingency. In the pro-
posed architecture, these handlers are executed by the Mission Manager because490
they can be seen as a special case of the Path Planners in Fig. 1. Thus, the goal
of a contingency handler is to override the Path Planner guidance used during
the nominal condition with some specific guidance based on safety concerns.
In general, the list of the required mitigation actions depends on the contin-
gency events under consideration. As a general rule, the proposed contingency495
procedures should be similar to those for manned aviation [49]. For this reason,
it is possible to classify them into two categories according to their impact on
the planned route:
1. Strategical contingency procedures are suitable when the initial route is
no longer feasible and thus a new mission has to be planned. The new500
reference path is often constructed with a more conservative design, with
limited turns, vertical speeds, etc. This mechanism protects against ex-
ceeding the flight envelope during a contingency state (thus causing a
nested alert), but also results in reduced aircraft performance due to the
contingency being faced. One example of these procedures might be flying505
towards the alternative landing site.
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2. Tactical contingency procedures are flight procedures that deviate the air-
craft from the intended route temporarily, though the original mission
may be resumed afterwards once the effect of the contingency has been
mitigated. In contrast to strategical contingency procedures, tactical ones510
often demand high flight performances, like in a traffic avoidance maneu-
ver.
Based on this differentiation, contingency handlers can be also classified
into two classes according to their alternative guidance method: contingency
handlers relying on the Mission Planner and contingency handlers requiring a515
Task Specific Planner. In general, all the tactical contingency procedures re-
quire a Task Specific Planner because the reference trajectory strongly depends
on the type of contingency being faced. By contrast, strategical contingency
procedures do not require a specific Path Planner be introduced but rather an
alternative route definition be provided to the Mission Planner. How to perform520
smooth transitions between the guiding actions of different Path Planners is an
interesting issue that exceeds the scope of this paper.
5.4. Performing the flight termination action
As was introduced in this paper, RPAS must often incorporate a Flight Ter-
mination System that is capable of safely bringing the vehicle back to the ground525
in case of severe contingencies. The work in [31] presents a survey of current
and future technologies and procedures for performing a controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT), including aerodynamic and ballistic terminations. Alternatives
are self-destruct systems that allow an in-flight destruction to be performed
without the loss of human lives [50]. However, this latter alternative may not530
be supported in RPAS that aim to operate within the certified category [49, 51].
In order to reduce the risk for people and ground facilities, the flight termi-
nation action should be performed in dedicated areas called Flight Termination
Points (FTPs). These points should be specified in the Mission Plan, segre-
gated by ATC and located in unpopulated areas or over the sea [17, 49]. For535
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this reason, whenever possible, the execution of this action should be preceded
by a strategical phase in which the RPAS tries to achieve the closest FTP.
6. Safety aspects relating to the software development
For the Mission Manager to be considered a safe system, it is necessary
not only to provide it with ACM functions, but also develop it following a re-540
liable software development process [52]. The software project for aerospace
applications like the one presented in this paper shall demonstrate an adequate
level of confidence in safety to comply with the aerospace standards for cer-
tification [34, 35]. The reference manual for the avionics industry is the DO-
178 standard. It defines an explicit correlation between the severity of system545
hazards and the scrutiny to which that system is subjected. In particular, it
establishes five software levels (Level A to E) related to the effect of five failure
conditions (Catastrophic to No safety effect). The work in [53] particularizes
the definition of these effects to the case of UAS. In DO-178, each level has a
number of objectives that must be met in the software development process. In550
short, the verification effort increases with the software level of a component.
In regards to UAS, the EASA concept of operation states that system haz-
ards are operation-centric [2]. According to this regulatory framework, un-
manned aircraft operating in the open category are not subject to certification
because the impact on safety of a software error is low: in this category, the air-555
craft is operated in visual line of sight (VLOS) and below 150 m, so a dedicated
remote pilot is assumed to be present at all times of the operation. Accordingly,
the remote pilot can take control of the vehicle at any point in the mission, and
specifically after a contingency occurs. It can therefore be reasonably justified
that the embedded software has no effect on the operation in terms of safety.560
However, large UAS operating in the specific category, and ultimately in the
certified category, can eventually operate beyond the line of sight (BVLOS) of
the remote pilot. In these cases, if the C2 link is lost, the software is essentially
replacing the remote pilot; and, for this reason, it becomes safety-critical and
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must be verified [52].565
In this section, we discuss the impact on safety of each architectural com-
ponent of the proposed Safe Mission Manager system. We also propose the
use of partitioning as a means of fault contention, and we allocate the differ-
ent software components to a partitioning scheme that allows the software level
of some architectural components to be downgraded. Finally, we propose the570
use of formal methods to facilitate the analysis and verification of the critical
software.
6.1. Preliminary software level determination
Based on the safety framework in Fig. 2, it is possible to ensure safety as
long as the RPAS has the ability to command the flight termination action in575
an expeditious manner, at any time and under any condition of the RPAS. In
the ACM scheme proposed in this paper, the Safety Monitor is the software
component with the ability to command this action autonomously, without the
collaboration of any other system. Accordingly, in the safety assessment, a
software error causing the loss of function of either the Safety Monitor or the580
Flight Termination System will have catastrophic effects. For this reason, the
two systems will be considered the hardcore components for maintaining safety
and should be assigned the highest software level.
In the case of the Contingency Manager and the Mission Manager compo-
nents, the loss of any of these systems means that the flight path of the vehicle585
cannot be controlled. According to [53], this is thought to have hazardous effects
on the operation of the RPAS as long as the vehicle is able to initiate a flight
termination procedure; otherwise, such fault would have catastrophic effects.
Consequently, assuming that the hardcore components of the architecture are
able to safely terminate the flight, the Contingency Manager and the Mission590
Manager could be assigned a software level “B”.
The problem that emerges is that, according to the DO-178 standard, soft-
ware components with common modes of failure cannot have different software
levels [35]. That is, if a software error occurs at some component, but this er-
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ror affects other functional components, then all these components should be595
assigned the software level associated with the most severe failure condition.
In the case of the Safe Mission Manager in Fig. 4, if a serial implementation
is conceived, then the loss of one component like the Mission Manager could
cause a total system loss; and, as a result, all the components in the architec-
ture should be assigned the same (highest) software level, which adds to the600
software development effort.
6.2. Architectural strategies for fault contention
To overcome this, the DO-178 standard proposes some architectural choices
that can limit the impact of failures to ultimately demonstrate that sufficient
independence between software components with respect to their failure modes605
exists [35]. If this is achieved, it is possible to separate safety-critical functions
to independent modules with independent failure modes. Consequently, it is
possible to downgrade the software level of some components by means of an
appropriate architectural choice.
One of the possible architectural choices is redundancy. Redundant configu-610
rations mitigate hazards by replicating system components in different proces-
sors. So if a fault (either a software fault or a hardware fault) causes a system
malfunction, the affected component can be replaced by a backup copy that
provides the same functionality, but one executed on different hardware. The
use of dissimilar, redundant components is required to avoid software develop-615
ment errors in this case. Redundant systems are common in aviation. Dual and
triple redundancy is often required in critical aircraft systems [54, 55]. However,
having dedicated hardware for each replicated application increases the system
complexity, as well as development costs. Moreover, in the case of UAS, the
reduced size and weight restrictions make redundancy hard to implement.620
Another architectural choice that can limit the impact of failures is parti-
tioning. Partitioned architectures, called Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA)
architectures in aerospace [56], provide protection and separation among ap-
plications running on the same hardware. This way, failures occurring in one
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partition are not propagated to other partitions.625
The support for IMA architectures is defined by ARINC-650 and ARINC-651
documents that specify general purpose hardware and software standards, and
by ARINC-653, which specifies the application programming interface (API)
[56]. Previous work by the authors presented an execution environment that
supports the IMA concept [57]. The proposed framework relies on XtratuM,630
a hypervisor for real-time embedded systems developed at the UPV [58]. One
of its guest real-time operating systems is LithOS [59], which is ARINC-653
compliant. The next section discusses how to exploit the IMA concept to allo-
cate the different Safe Mission Manager components to the proposed execution
framework.635
6.2.1. Definition of the partitioning scheme
The definition of the partitioning scheme is a design issue. The simplest
solution would be to allocate all the software components to a single partition.
However, this does not exploit the IMA concept and implies that a fault oc-
curring at some component can produce a total system loss. The opposite is640
allocating each function to a separate partition, but this unreasonably increases
the system complexity. To overcome this, we propose an intermediate solution
based on allocating software components according to their impact on overall
safety.
Accordingly, the proposed partitioning scheme will be composed of two par-645
titions, represented in Fig. 7. In this scheme, partition P0 allocates the software
components that can contribute to failure conditions with catastrophic conse-
quences; these are the Safety Monitor and the Flight Termination systems. Most
of the software verification effort will fall on this partition. By contrast, parti-
tion P1 allocates the components whose failure is considered to have hazardous650
effects in the safety assessment, i.e. the Contingency Manager and the Mission
Manager systems.
The advantage of this partitioning scheme is that a fault occurring at a
















Figure 7: Safe Mission Manager partitioning scheme.
partition P0. In other words, a software error affecting partition P1 will not have655
catastrophic consequences because partition P0 is still able to perform the flight
termination action (even if P1 fails). As a result, it is possible to downgrade the
software level of the Contingency Manager and the Mission Manager from level
“A” (in case of a serial implementation) to level “B” and reduce the number of
verification objectives.660
6.3. Formal methods for software verification
Along with fault contention mechanisms, reliable software design method-
ologies must also be followed in the software development process to assure that
critical software is of high quality and error-free. Practices like defensive pro-
gramming are often suggested for reducing software complexity and ultimately665
limiting the chance of introducing errors. For example, it is possible to limit
the use of a programming language to a subset; this avoids the use of structures
that could lead to non-deterministic behaviors. But the key mechanism for er-
ror prevention is the use of verification methods that ensure that errors entered
into the software lifecycle get detected. In the previous version of the DO-178670
standard (version B), the verification process mostly relies on generating a large
set of test cases for different steps in the development process. However, the
coverage of these tests cannot demonstrate the total absence of errors in the
code [18]. Another shortcoming is that safety-related requirements are often
difficult to test following such verification strategy [19, 60].675
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The last version of the DO-178 standard (version C) introduces the use of
formal methods through the specific supplement DO-333 [61]. A formal method
is defined as a formal analysis carried out on a formal model [35]. A formal
model is a system description expressed with a formal specification language,
i.e. with precise syntax and formal semantics. Such models can be useful680
in several phases of the development process, such as for the simulation of the
system behavior or the reasoning over such system representation, among others.
The most extended use is formal verification, however, which is the aim of the
DO-333 supplement and of this work as well.
A formal specification makes it possible for system properties to be defined685
in a precise, consistent and complete way [62]. When used for verification,
properties are deduced from the system requirements, and in the case of safety-
critical system, from the safety requirements. Then, formal methods can be
used to verify these properties against the model to reveal design errors or
model inconsistencies, and ultimately to provide verification evidence for the690
certification process. One of the advantages of formal methods is that safety-
critical properties can be checked more easily than with a conventional testing
strategy [18, 19, 60].
The DO-333 supplement allows three classes of formal methods to satisfy
certification objectives: theorem proving, abstract interpretation and model695
checking. This latter method is the focus of this work, while the remaining ones
are omitted for brevity. In model checking, the model is represented as a finite-
state machine (FSM), and the properties are formalized using temporal logic.
Both the model and the properties are deduced manually from the system that
is being verified. Then, the entire state space of the FSM is analyzed to check700
the validity of the formal properties, with the advantage that this analysis is
fully automated. If a property is not satisfied, a counter-example is generated,
and the model or the property can be refined and analyzed again. The resulting
process is schematized in Fig. 8.
The application of model checking techniques to safety-critical avionics sys-705


















Figure 8: Model checking process. Source: [60].
exploit this method in the software development of the ACM functions presented
in this work.
7. Formal design and verification of a contingency management pol-
icy: a case study710
This section illustrates the use of model checking to verify the correctness
of a contingency management policy. Based on the contingency management
scheme in Sec. 5, contingency management policy depends on the Safety Moni-
tor state automaton and on the Contingency Plan. Accordingly, we will develop
a particular specification for these models, and we will identity some properties715
with which these models must comply. Then, we will translate both the models
and the properties into a formal language and use the NuSMV model checking
tool [64] to analyze the formal model with regards to the properties. The result-
ing process will ensure that the system design reaches a certain level of quality
before it is implemented.720
It is to be noted that the contingency management policy should respond
to a system safety assessment. The type of contingency events to be handled
and the required responses to these events often vary depending on the type of
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and the type of mission being performed. It is
not the goal of this paper to present one given policy for a specific application.725
Rather, the purpose is to show how the development and verification of a realistic
avionics application can benefit from formal methods. For this reason, the
proposed policy will serve for demonstration purposes only. In any case, it will
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be developed in compliance with current airspace regulation and will aim to be
generic enough so that it can be applied to a variety of RPA performing different730
mission types.
7.1. Specification of the Safety Monitor model
The proposed Safety Monitor model accounts for the occurrence of the five
contingency events described below. These are the fault hypothesis of this case
study, which are in line with the three key risk areas reported in [1]. Indeed, it735
is reasonable to expect these events to occur on any type of RPAS mission. If
different fault hypothesis are assumed, then the subsequent design steps should
also be rewritten.
a. C2 link loss is considered to be any situation in which the RPA can no
longer be controlled by the remote pilot due to the degradation or total loss740
of the communication channel. This is likely even when redundant data link
architectures are provided. Possible causes include screening terrain, ocean
wave effects, malicious interferences, out of range, equipment failure and
aircraft maneuvers.
The C2 link mode of failure is not always a fail-stop failure (i.e. a “clean”745
failure). Usually, the C2 link experiences a degradation in which repetitive
and intermittent unavailabilities or delays in the transaction time occur. It
is therefore important to determine the sustained loss of link Tsloss, which
is the time period at which the C2 link should be declared as being lost.
b. GPS loss of performance is due to the lack of satellite coverage or to a poor750
satellite signal. According to ICAO’s Performance-Based Navigation (PBN)
[55], this performance degradation must be detected by RAIM systems. The
navigation system continuously computes its Actual Navigation Performance
(ANP), which is the maximum navigation error. When the ANP is higher
than a specified Required Navigation Performance (RNP) then the system755
must signal a GPS loss.
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c. Loss of control refers to situations where the pilot or the automatic guid-
ance system are unable to control the aircraft, resulting in an unrecoverable
deviation from the intended flight path. This is one of the most complex
contingencies, involving numerous contributing factors that act individually760
or, more often, in combination. These factors include mechanical failures,
weather conditions, sensor failures and ineffective aircraft control. Loss of
control can be detected because the aircraft enters a flight regime outside its
normal flight envelope. Ineffective control occurs when the guidance system
provides the control loops with targets that cannot be achieved. Control sys-765
tems attempt to prevent this situation by setting a flight envelope protection
that puts some limits on attitude and speed targets; however, mechanical
failures or extreme environmental conditions can make these preventive ac-
tions ineffective.
d. Traffic alert refers to the Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability which in RPAS770
relies on ACAS Xu equipment [23]. It provides two alarm thresholds: Traffic
Advisories (TAs) and Resolution Advisories (RAs). TA is an indication
alerting that a certain intruder is a potential threat. RA is an indication
requiring the pilot to perform a quick maneuver deviating from the current
flight path to provide separation from collision threats. False alerts are an775
important issue in collision avoidance systems. Variability in pilot behavior
and aircraft dynamics make it difficult to predict where the intruder aircraft
will be in the future. This requires a tradeoff between safety and operational
considerations.
e. Mission boundary limits violation deals with two slightly different problems:780
no-fly zones and geofencing, see Fig. 9. On one hand, no-fly zones are loca-
tions where flight may be restricted by regulation or raise safety concerns.
The RPAS shall not fly into these zones. On the other hand, geofencing
consists of setting some boundaries or contention barriers to the area where
the RPAS operation takes place and taking the proper measures to enforce785






Figure 9: No-fly zones and geofencing.
its. The RPAS shall not fly out of these zones. When the whole mission
takes place in segregated airspace, these limits also include the path from
the aerodrome to and from the operations area.
No-fly zones and geofencing require continuous monitoring and checking790
of boundary violations. Two type of boundaries associated with the two
alarm thresholds are usually considered. A hard boundary defines the limits
that should never be trespassed. Violation of this boundary implies flight
termination. A soft boundary defines the limits of the last chance to turn
before violating mission boundaries. This limit strongly depends on the795
aircraft performance and the navigation performance.
7.1.1. Decision logic
The Safety Monitor model must diagnose each of the previous contingencies
and decide whether the resulting state is to be handled by the Contingency Man-
ager or by the Flight Termination System. In this case study, we determine that800
the occurrence of one single “soft” contingency can be addressed by the Contin-
gency Manager, but any combination of nested contingencies or the occurrence
of a “hard” event require instant flight termination. The resulting decision
logic is modeled in Fig. 10. It shows an FSM with seven states: the nominal


































Figure 10: The Safety Monitor model presents one nominal state (in white) and several
contingency states (in gray). State transitions gij are triggered by contingency events (i < j)
and by recovery events (i > j).
to S6, one per contingency under study). For example, Autonomous operation
(S2) describes C2 link loss conditions; Degraded navigation (S3) implies reduced
navigation capability due to GPS loss of performance, etc. Transitions between
these states are labeled as gij , where i is the initial state and j is the resulting
state. They can be triggered by contingency events (those where i < j) or by810
recovery events (i > j).
Some important properties of this model are: there should always be a tran-
sition for reaching the flight termination state in one step; the flight termination
state should be a final state (i.e. one that has no successors); and one risk mit-
igation state must not be reached from another risk mitigation state in a direct815
manner.
Finally, note that if a different policy is conceived, then different states
should be considered. For example, if risk mitigation measures are allowed for
nested alert conditions, then additional states between single risk mitigation
states (S2 to S6) and flight termination (S7) should be added (for instance,820
Autonomous traffic alert).
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7.2. Specification of the Contingency Plan model
The behavior of the Contingency Plan model is subject to the behavior of the
Safety Monitor model: when a risk mitigation state is entered, the Contingency
Plan determines an appropriate contingency procedure by means of a decision825
logic. The specification of the Contingency Plan model thus requires the def-
inition of: a) a list of suitable contingency procedures for the risk mitigation
states under study, and b) the corresponding decision logic. The list of proce-
dures is, of course, dependent on the Safety Monitor states: if different states
are considered, then the list of procedures should be reevaluated, as should the830
decision logic.
Based on the risk mitigation states in this case study (Fig. 10), we propose a
series of procedures inspired by the emergency procedures for manned aviation
and by the contingency options in Doc. 10019 AN/507 [3]. The list contains four
contingency procedures of a tactical nature, including: a.1) loitering, a.2) climb-835
ing to regain the signal (either the GPS signal or C2 link signal), a.3) avoidance
maneuver, and a.4) reverting to manual control; and two strategical contingency
options: b.1) landing at a designated landing site, and b.2) flight termination.
The fact that the flight termination action is also available for the Contin-
gency Plan warrants special attention. Even though the Safety Monitor has not840
entered the Flight termination state (meaning that there is still a safety margin
for attempting a risk mitigation action), the Contingency Manager might be
unable to find a more convenient option for a given contingency state. In these
cases, flight termination will be commanded by the Contingency Manager, with
the difference that it will not necessarily be performed expeditiously; by con-845
trast, it can be preceded by a strategical phase in which the RPAS attempts to
reach one of the FTPs specified in the Mission Plan, thus increasing safety.
Each of the aforementioned procedures can be executed under specified con-
ditions only. For example, revert to manual control shall not be executed if
the C2 link is lost. Another example is the landing procedure, which should850
not be executed after the GPS loss because it requires a high navigation accu-
racy. In order to develop such requirements, we propose using the Classification
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Tree Method (CTM) [65], a graphical methodology that facilitates the require-
ment specification in the following manner: 1) it helps to identify the relevant
variables for the decision-making problem, as well as their possible values; 2)855
it eases the analysis of nested alerts (if applicable); and especially, 3) formal
requirements can be directly extracted from the tree.
The resulting classification tree is presented in Fig. 11. It shows that the
set of requirements are expressed in terms of the state variables introduced in
Sec. 5.2; these are the tree branches. Therefore, the requirements are expressed860
as follows: a) when a specific value of one variable is required to select the
procedure, it is marked with a black dot; in this case, the remaining values of
this variable shall be left with no mark for this procedure. b) When the variable
is not relevant for the selection of this procedure, then all their possible values
are marked with a question mark.865
7.2.1. Decision logic
Based on the previous list of options, we propose the following decision logic
for the different risk mitigation states under study. Note that, for brevity, the
following logic only accounts for contingencies occurring during the en-route
phase, although the full policy can be easily extended:870
a. After the C2 link loss event, the system is in the Autonomous operation
state. In this state, the goal is to minimize the time of flight “not under
command” [3]. According to ICAO, this can be achieved by either landing
at a designated landing site, climbing to regain the signal, or performing
the flight termination action. We assume that all of these options have875
some configuration parameters specified in the Mission Plan that determine
the associated locations at which each procedure is to be performed, see
Sec. 5.2. That is, the Mission Plan will specify all the possible airdromes
and the allowed areas for climbing and terminating the flight. Based on
this assumption, we suggest deciding whether to land or climb depending880
on which option is closer to the current position of the RPAS; and in case






































































reached), then flight termination will be selected.
b. A GPS loss of performance does not imply that the aircraft cannot determine
its position by other means. Alternatives are ground-based navigation aids885
(if available) and dead-reckoning. However, the accuracy of these methods
is lower than that of GPS and is probably insufficient for performing a given
mission or complying with the RNP [55]. As such, after the loss of the GPS
signal, the system evolves to the Degraded navigation state. In this state, if
the RPAS is flying in controlled airspace, PBN specifications require it to890
revert to manual control. Otherwise, climbing to regain the signal or loitering
are the most convenient options, depending on their associated locations and
the current position of the RPAS.
c. The only suitable action for dealing with the Degraded control state is re-
verting to manual control. Note that, in order to maintain safety, this pro-895
cedure should be performed without resulting in a transient that requires
exceptional piloting skill or alertness from the RPA crew [66].
d. During a Traffic alert, the ACAS Xu equipment allows an automatic avoid-
ance maneuver to be performed in order to regain the separation minima.
ACAS Xu goes beyond conventional Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance900
Systems (TCAS) as it not only informs the pilot, but also executes the
recommended evasion maneuver (though the remote pilot still retains the
ability to override the proposed action).
e. Surpassing the soft boundary of a geofence or a no-fly zone causes a Bound-
ary alert state. In this state, the RPAS starts an avoidance maneuver to go905
back inside the mission limits. If this is achieved, the original mission can
be automatically resumed afterwards.
7.3. Formal specification and verification of the policy
In order to verify the proposed contingency management policy using the
model checking techniques, it is necessary to translate the previous specifica-910
tion into a formal language. In this case, we will use the SMV language, and
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NuSMV as the model checking tool. The resulting formal model of the contin-
gency management policy will be composed of two modules: the Safety Monitor
module, and the Contingency Plan module. An extract from these modules is
shown in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.915
As it can be observed, both modules start with a declaration of the state
variables using the VAR command. This is followed by the specification of the
FSM that describes the behavior of each model. In SMV, the FSM is declared
using the ASSIGN command, followed by the initial value init(state) and the
list of transitions next(state). The last part of the modules specifies the prop-920
erties with which the model must comply. In this case, the properties will be
expressed using Computation Tree Logic (CTL) formulae, where CTLSPEC de-
fines the start of a CTL expression, and “->” is the logical implication operator.
The remaining notation is described in [64].
In the case of the Safety Monitor model, an extract of the FSM in Fig. 10925
is shown in lines 58 to 72 of Fig. 12. In particular, it shows some transitions
from the Nominal and Autonomous operation states. With respect to the formal
properties, some relevant requirements presented in Sec. 7.1 are also formalized
in this extract. For example, lines 121 to 125 specify that if a soft contingency
event occurs when flying in a Nominal state, then the next state shall be a risk930
mitigation state; or that the Flight termination state shall be always reachable;
and that it must be reachable in one step. Note that these properties have
been specified using symbolic declarations like recoveryEvent, hardEvent, or
riskMitigationState, which are omitted in the extract for brevity.
In the case of the Contingency Plan model, the corresponding module is in-935
voked with four input parameters, see line 137 of Fig. 13. These are the variables
on which the decision logic of the Contingency Plan relies: sm state corresponds
to the variable state of the Safety Monitor module; shortestContingency-
Route specifies which contingency procedure has an associated location that
is closer to the current position of the RPAS; inEnrouteSegment describes940
whether the current phase of flight is en-route or not; and inControlled-




26 state : {nominal, autonomousOp, degradedNav, degradedControl, trafficAlert,
27 boundaryAlert, flightTermination};
28 event : {c2LinkLoss, gpsLoss, lossOfControl, trafficAlert,
29 softBoundaryAlert, hardBoundaryAlert, c2LinkRcv, gpsRcv, inSteadyFlight,
30 trafficWellClear, boundaryWellClear};
31 DEFINE
32 softEvent := (event = c2LinkLoss | event = gpsLoss | event = lossOfControl |
33 event = trafficAlert | event = softBoundaryAlert);
· · ·
58 ASSIGN -- Safety Monitor state automaton
59 init (state) := nominal;
60 next (state) :=
61 case
62 --In S1: Nominal operation
63 state = nominal & event = c2LinkLoss : autonomousOp; --g12
64 state = nominal & event = gpsLoss : degradedNav; --g13
65 state = nominal & event = lossOfControl : degradedControl; --g14
66 state = nominal & event = trafficAlert : trafficAlert; --g15
67 state = nominal & event = softBoundaryAlert : boundaryAlert; --g16
68 --In S2: Autonomous operation
69 state = autonomousOp & event = c2LinkRcv : nominal; --g21
70 state = autonomousOp & (event = trafficAlert | event = softBoundaryAlert
71 | event = gpsLoss | event = lossOfControl) : flightTermination; --g27
72 --In S3: Degraded navigation
· · ·
121 CTLSPEC AG (state = nominal & softEvent -> AX riskMitigationState);
122 CTLSPEC AG (riskMitigationState & recoveryEvent -> AX state = nominal);
123 CTLSPEC AG (hardEvent -> AX state = flightTermination);
124 CTLSPEC AG (state=flightTermination -> ! EF state != flightTermination);
125 CTLSPEC AG EF (state = flightTermination);
Figure 12: Extract of the Safety Monitor model in SMV language.
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137 MODULE contingencyPlan (sm state, shortestContingencyRoute, inEnrouteSegment,
138 inControlledAirspace)
139 VAR
140 contingencyProc : {continueOriginalPlan, loiter, climb, avoidanceManeuver,
141 toManual, land, flightTermination};
· · ·
150 ASSIGN
151 init (contingencyProc) := continueOriginalPlan;
152 next (contingencyProc) :=
153 case
154 --In S1: Nominal operation
155 sm_state = nominal & tacticalProc : continueOriginalPlan;
156 --In S2: Autonomous operation
157 sm state = autonomousOp & inEnrouteSegment &
158 shortestContingencyRoute = climb : climb;
159 sm state = autonomousOp & inEnrouteSegment &
160 shortestContingencyRoute = land : land;
161 sm state = autonomousOp & inEnrouteSegment & shortestContingencyRoute
162 != climb & shortestContingencyRoute != land : flightTermination;
163 sm state = autonomousOp & ! inEnrouteSegment : flightTermination;
164 --In S3: Degraded navigation
· · ·
188 CTLSPEC AG ((inEnrouteSegment & ! inLossOfControl & ! inTrafficAlert & !
189 inBoundaryAlert) | AX contingencyProc != loiter)
190 CTLSPEC AG ((inEnrouteSegment & ! inLossOfControl & ! inTrafficAlert & !
191 inBoundaryAlert) | AX contingencyProc != climb)
192 CTLSPEC AG ((inEnrouteSegment & ! inGpsLoss & ! inLossOfControl) | AX
193 contingencyProc != avoidanceManeuver)
194 CTLSPEC AG ((! inC2Loss) | AX contingencyProc != toManual)
195 CTLSPEC AG ((inEnrouteSegment & ! inGpsLoss & ! inLossOfControl & !
196 inTrafficAlert & ! inBoundaryAlert) | AX contingencyProc != land)
197 CTLSPEC AG EF contingencyProc=flightTermination;
Figure 13: Extract of the Contingency Plan model in SMV language.
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Figure 14: Verification results in the NuSMV console.
as boolean variables for simplicity.
Then, an extract of the FSM describing the decision logic of Sec. 7.2.1 is
shown in lines 150 to 164 of Fig. 13. For example, the contingency procedure945
(contingencyProc) that will be selected during the Autonomous operation can
be either climb, land, or flightTermination, depending on the RPAS condi-
tion. The last part of this extract shows the preconditions for activating each
procedure, which were depicted in the classification tree of Fig. 11. In this case,
they have been formalized using CTL formulae of the form AG(s | AX !p), see950
lines 188 to 197; meaning that each occurrence of condition p (the activation of
a procedure) is preceded by condition s (the required state condition) [67].
Finally, the previous modules shall be instantiated from a main module which
is here omitted for brevity. The resulting SMV file can then be interpreted by
NuSMV, which will check if the CTL specifications are satisfied by the model.955
The output of this program is shown in Fig. 14. It shows that the transition
relation is total, and that all specifications hold. In summary, the results demon-
strate the correctness of the proposed policy before it can be implemented.
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8. Conclusions
Current proposals for a regulatory framework for UAS are operation-centric960
and rely on a risk analysis. In order to achieve the target level of safety, we
proposed increasing the level of automation of the on-board system by inserting
Automated Contingency Management functions. In this paper, we discussed the
architectural design of the resulting system, which we called the Safe Mission
Manager. The proposed solution provides an interesting balance between safety965
and robustness as it is able to adapt autonomously to contingencies by provid-
ing different risk mitigation policies before commanding the flight termination
action.
We also discussed safety aspects related to the software development of this
system. As a result of this analysis, we proposed the use of partitioning as a970
means for fault contention, and we allocated the different software components
of the Safe Mission Manager to a particular partitioning configuration. This
configuration is expected to reduce the software verification effort of the certi-
fication process as it makes it possible to downgrade the software level of some
components of the architecture.975
In addition, we proposed using formal methods for software verification. For-
mal methods, and particularly formal model checking, can help in analyzing the
consistency, completeness and correctness of a software model. In this paper,
we illustrated the model checking technique using the specification of a con-
tingency management policy as a case study. We identified the most relevant980
contingencies for RPAS, proposed a list of mitigation actions and developed
the corresponding decision logic. Finally, we modeled all these aspects using a
formal specification and demonstrated that the software design is correct before
implementation.
In the future, we plan to develop a novel Mission Plan specification that sup-985
ports the definition of the configuration parameters of the different contingency
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[10] R. Román, F. J. Sáez-Nieto, C. Cuerno, RPAS Integration in Non-
segregated Airspace: the SESAR Approach, in: 4th SESAR Innovation
Days, SESAR Joint Undertaking, Madrid, Spain, 2014.1025
[11] L. Tang, A. Saxena, M. E. Orchard, G. J. Kacprzynski, G. Vachtsevanos,
A. Patterson-Hine, Simulation-based Design and Validation of Automated
Contingency Management for Propulsion Systems, in: Aerospace Confer-
ence, IEEE, Big Sky, MT, USA, 2007, pp. 1–11.
[12] A. Saxena, M. E. Orchard, B. Zhang, G. Vachtsevanos, L. Tang, Y. Lee,1030
Y. Wardi, Automated Contingency Management for Propulsion Systems,
in: European Control Conference (ECC), IEEE, Kos, Greece, 2007, pp.
3515–3522.
[13] L. Tang, G. Kacprzynski, K. Goebel, J. Reimann, M. E. Orchard, A. Sax-
ena, B. Saha, Prognostics in the Control Loop, in: AAAI Fall Symposium1035
on Artificial Intelligence for Prognostics, AAAI, Arlington, VA, USA, 2007.
[14] J. Li, G. Vachtsevanos, Human-machine interface: A framework for
contingency management of complex aerospace systems, in: IEEE AU-
TOTESTCON, IEEE, National Harbor, MD, USA, 2015, pp. 80–86.
doi:10.1109/AUTEST.2015.7356470.1040
43
[15] P. Kopardekar, Safely enabling UAS operations in low-altitude airspace,
in: Unmanned Aerial Systems Traffic Management (UTM) Convention,
NASA, Moffett Field, CA, USA, 2015.
[16] B. Korn, A. Udovic, File and Fly: Procedures and techniques for inte-
gration of UAVs in controlled airspace, in: 25th Congress of International1045
Council of the Aeronautical Sciences, ICAS, Hamburg, Germany, 2006.
[17] M. Finke, Defining RPAS emergency procedures for controllers, remote
pilots and automatic on-board systems, in: Deutscher Luft- und Raum-
fahrtkongress (DLRK), Braunschweig, Germany, 2016.
[18] C. Torens, F. Adolf, Using Formal Requirements and Model-Checking for1050
Verification and Validation of an Unmanned Rotorcraft, in: AIAA Infotech
@ Aerospace, AIAA SciTech, AIAA, 2015, pp. 1645–1657. doi:10.2514/6.
2015-1645.
[19] D. Cofer, S. P. Miller, Formal Methods: Case Studies for DO-333, Technical
Report NASA/CR-2014-218244, NF1676L-18435, NASA Langley Research1055
Center, Hampton, VA, USA, 2014.
[20] A. Frey, T. Hanti, Expanding the operational range of UAS with an
onboard supervisory instance, in: 34th Digital Avionics Systems Con-
ference (DASC), IEEE/AIAA, Prague, Czech Republic, 2015, pp. 1–12.
doi:10.1109/DASC.2015.7311437.1060
[21] M. U. de Haag, P. Duan, A multiple hypothesis predictive alerting (MHPA)
method for improved aircraft state awareness, in: 34th Digital Avionics
Systems Conference (DASC), IEEE/AIAA, Prague, Czech Republic, 2015,
pp. 1–15. doi:10.1109/DASC.2015.7311443.
[22] Y. Kim, M. J. Kochenderfer, J. Grana, J. Bono, D. Wolpert, Optimal1065
lost-link policies for unmanned aircraft, in: 34th Digital Avionics Systems
Conference (DASC), IEEE/AIAA, Prague, Czech Republic, 2015, pp. 1–13.
doi:10.1109/DASC.2015.7311430.
44
[23] G. Manfredi, Y. Jestin, An introduction to ACAS Xu and the chal-
lenges ahead, in: 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC),1070
IEEE/AIAA, Sacramento, CA, USA, 2016, pp. 1–9. doi:10.1109/DASC.
2016.7778055.
[24] R. P. Bonasso, R. J. Firby, E. Gat, D. Kortenkamp, D. P. Miller, M. G.
Slack, Experiences with an architecture for intelligent, reactive agents,
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 9 (1997) 237–1075
256. doi:10.1080/095281397147103.
[25] Aeronautical Radio, Inc., ARINC specification 424-15. Navigation System
Data Base, 2000.
[26] G. J. Ducard, Fault-tolerant flight control and guidance systems, 1st ed.,
Springer-Verlag, London, 2009.1080
[27] K. Berry, M. Sawyer, E. Austrian, Human Factors Assessment of RNAV
Approach and Departure Procedures, Technical Report, FAA Human Fac-
tors Division (ANG-C1), 2013.
[28] C. W. Johnson, The hidden human factors in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,
in: 26th International Conference on Systems Safety, International Systems1085
Safety Society, Vancouver, Canada, 2008.
[29] T. B. Sheridan, W. L. Verplank, Human and computer control of under-
sea teleoperators, Technical Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1978.
[30] G. Wild, J. Murray, G. Baxter, Exploring civil drone accidents and inci-1090
dents to help prevent potential air disasters, MDPI Aerospace 3 (2016).
doi:10.3390/aerospace3030022.
[31] R. Stansbury, T. Wilson, W. Tanis, A Technology Survey of Emergency
Recovery and Flight Termination Systems for UAS, in: AIAA Infotech @
Aerospace, AIAA SciTech, AIAA, Seattle, WA, USA, 2009, pp. 2038–2045.1095
doi:10.2514/6.2009-2038.
45
[32] European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, EUROCONTROL
Specifications for the Use of Military Remotely Piloted Aircraft as Opera-
tional Air Traffic Outside Segregated Airspace, 2nd ed., 2012.
[33] A. P. Williams, P. D. Scharre (Eds.), Autonomous Systems: Issues for1100
Defense Policymakers, NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation,
Norfolk, VA, USA, 2015.
[34] NATO Standardization Agency, STANAG 4671: Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
cles Systems Airworthiness Requirements (USAR), NATO, 2009.
[35] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), DO-178C/ED-12C1105
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,
Washington, D.C., USA, 2011.
[36] M. Leucker, C. Schallhart, A Brief Account of Runtime Verification, The
Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009). doi:10.1016/j.
jlap.2008.08.004.1110
[37] F. Adolf, P. Faymonville, B. Finkbeiner, S. Schirmer, C. Torens, Stream
Runtime Monitoring on UAS, in: S. Lahiri, G. Reger (Eds.), Runtime
Verification. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 10548, Springer,
Cham, 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-67531-2_3.
[38] F. Mattern, Virtual time and global states of distributed systems, in:1115
Parallel and Distributed Algorithms, North-Holland, 1989, pp. 215–226.
[39] A. Dheedan, Distributed Online Safety Monitor Based on Multi-Agent
System and AADL Safety Assessment Model, in: Q. A. Memon (Ed.),
Distributed networks: Intelligence, security, and applications, CRC Press,
2008, pp. 317–345.1120
[40] E. Kiyak, F. Caliskan, Application of Fuzzy Logic in Aircraft Sensor Fault
Diagnosis, International Journal of Systems Applications, Engineering &
Development 6 (2012).
46
[41] K. Blin, M. Akian, F. Bonnans, E. Hoffman, C. Martini, K. Zeghal, A
Stochastic Conflict Detection Model Revisited, in: 18th Applied Aero-1125
dynamics Conference, AIAA, Denver, CO, USA, 2000, pp. 4270–4279.
doi:10.2514/6.2000-4270.
[42] M. J. Kochenderfer, J. E. Holland, J. P. Chryssanthacopoulos, Next-
Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System, Lincoln Laboratory
Journal 19 (2012).1130
[43] M. O. Rabin, Probabilistic automata, Information and Control 6 (1963)
230–245. doi:10.1016/S0019-9958(63)90290-0.
[44] M. T. DeGarmo, Issues concerning integration of unmanned aerial vehicles
in civil airspace, Technical Report, MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation
System Development, 2004.1135
[45] International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 2 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air, 10th ed., ICAO, Montréal,
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